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1I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon
History: 1660-1783 in 18901 inspired the greatest, and possibly the most widely 
misconceived, era of naval competition the world has ever seen.  Universally heralded as 
a masterpiece of naval history and strategy, Mahan's conception of sea power can be 
reduced to a single proverb: great nations build great navies and great navies build great 
nations. The influence of Mahanian logic can be seen throughout the 20th century, in 
times of both war and peace, as industrializing nations struggled first to build navies, then 
to achieve or maintain naval superiority, or at least parity, and finally, almost as an 
afterthought, to find constructive uses for their glorious fleets.  Sadly, as the 20th century 
advanced, many nations discovered their highly prized navies to be extremely limited in 
terms of their strategic value and generally insufficient in terms of achieving and 
maintaining the military supremacy and national security they had been built to ensure.
There are two main questions this thesis will attempt to address.  The first 
concerns the naval strategy of the United States and the concept of naval transformation.  
With the conclusion of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Navy, the United 
States Navy suddenly found itself mostly alone as it continued to sail the deep waters of 
world's oceans, waiting and hoping for the rise of another adversary worthy of its grand 
fleet.  In the continued absence of a "near peer" competitor, the U.S. Navy has set about 
reevaluating the nature of its naval strategy and developing a plan to redesign itself into a 
force and fleet more suitable to the post-Cold War and, more recently, the post-9/11 
security environment.  To this end, this thesis will attempt to determine if the strategic 
vision and guidance outlined in the United States Navy's Transformation Roadmap 
constitutes new and original thinking aimed at delivering a realistic and suitable strategy
to ensure the nation's security or a repackaged version of the Mahanian logic intended to 
color the strategic landscape in such a way as to justify the continued maintenance of
1 Crowl, P.A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Makers of Modern Strategy: from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 446.
2those legacy missions, platforms, and capabilities the Navy, as an organization, most 
highly prizes.  In essence, does this transformation roadmap lead to a realized future or an 
idealized future?
Regardless of whatever strategy the nation and the Navy adopts, the size, 
composition, capabilities, and limitations of the Navy's fleet and force structure will 
dictate success or failure in terms of its implementation and realization.  Unlike the 
Army's tanks and the Air Force's planes, the individual ships and submarines which make 
up the fighting arm of the Navy each take years to build and costs billions of dollars to 
build, operate, and maintain.  This is not to say procurement, maintenance, and operation 
of platforms is less problematic for the other services, only that these difficulties are 
fundamentally different for the Navy in terms of their nature and scale.  For the most part, 
airplanes and tanks designed to fight over and on the plains of Europe are fairly easy to 
repaint and reequip to fight in the desert where they may not be as perfectly suited but 
have still shown themselves to be vary capable – a process involving time measured in 
weeks or months and budgets measured in millions of dollars.  Ships and submarines 
designed to operate far from land in the deepest waters of the oceans, on the other hand, 
cannot simply be modified to sail into coastal waters which are shallower than the
environments in which they were designed to float.  Entering these waters is problematic 
enough, but to do so while engaging the coastal patrol craft and fast missile boats favored 
by the vast majority of our potential enemies could easily lead to disaster.  Successful 
operation in such an environment requires the design and procurement of completely new 
platforms and capabilities, a process involving time measured in years and decades and 
budgets measured in hundreds of billions of dollars.  For these reasons, this thesis will 
also seek to evaluate how well the U.S. Navy has demonstrated itself to be in terms of 
determining which platforms and capabilities it requires to achieve success in both the 
current and future threat environments, as well as in designing and procuring these 
platforms.
B. BACKGROUND
Throughout its existence, the U.S. Navy has labored under the continuous scrutiny 
and skepticism of critics who have either questioned its strategic relevance or cost.  In the 
United States, this historic and ongoing debate has led to a range of circumstances, from 
3the complete dissolution of the service in 1781,2 to the aircraft carrier and submarine 
replacing the battleship as the centerpieces of the fleet both during and following World 
War II, to the rise of seagoing nuclear propulsion and weaponry during the 1950 and 60's.
Most recently, this continuing debate has centered on the various merits, limitations, 
benefits and difficulties of littoral or shallow-water combat capabilities, amphibious 
assault operations, long range precision strike operations, and the role of aircraft carrier 
battle groups (CVBG) which, in a telling display of shifting organizational imperatives,
have recently been re-designated as aircraft carrier strike groups (CSG). Rising costs of 
procurement have further influenced this debate, increasing the stakes of success and 
failure in terms of correctly evolving the most suitable naval strategy matched to force 
structure and size.
C. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH LITERATURE
The research in support of this thesis is based on both primary and secondary 
sources.  Primary sources include an array of policy statements, strategic guidance, and 
directives promulgated by senior policy makers and strategists in the United States Navy 
and the Department of Defense.  Additionally, various open source U.S. Navy doctrine, 
technical documentation, and news articles were reviewed.  Secondary sources include
historical articles and commentary, journal articles, relevant books and research studies.
This thesis will use a three-tiered analysis focusing on the strategic imperatives behind 
the Navy's transformation, the viability of the programs and platforms outlined within the 
plan, and an evaluation of the interaction between strategy and platforms.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
1. Introduction
This chapter presents a brief background of the concept of Mahanian sea power 
and its historical influence on the naval strategy of the United States.  In addition to 
illustrating the underlying context of these issues, this chapter will describe the resources 
and methodology used to conduct the supporting research for this thesis and discuss how 
the remainder of the thesis will be organized.
2 Love, R.W. Jr., History of the U.S. Navy Volume One: 1775-1941. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 42.
42. On Naval Strategy
This chapter will consider Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories of sea power and their 
influence on the role and nature of naval strategy throughout the 20th century.  Although 
Mahan's theories have been widely misunderstood or selectively employed over the 
course of the last 125 years, this has neither served to break nor even lessen their power 
to influence the minds of many political leaders, naval strategists, and professional naval 
officers.  Mahan's theories continue to shape naval strategy regardless of their flaws or 
inconsistencies.  Theories and strategies, once adopted, may take on a life of their own 
and the longer they hold sway over an organization, in this case the U.S. Navy, the more 
difficult it becomes to dislodge them or even modify or update them.  
After more than a century of grand naval strategy based on Mahanian principles,
and more than fifty years of fleets and formations built around aircraft carriers, the U.S. 
Navy finds itself increasingly trapped in a situation in which its existing force structure 
precludes its ability to adopt radically different strategies.  The net result is a naval 
strategy determined by the realities of force structure rather than the realities of the 
security environment. While a large force of carrier battle groups and nuclear submarines 
may have been the perfect answer to the Soviet Navy, consideration must be given as to 
why the Soviet Union built the navy it did: was it because mastery of the seas was 
necessary to realize communist ideology or because the Soviet Union fell prey to the 
allure of Mahan's principles and built a navy intended to counter the huge force the 
United States itself possessed at the conclusion of World War II?  If the size and structure 
of the U.S. Navy inspired the rise of the Soviet Navy, will it inspire the rise of another 
near peer competitor now that the Soviet Navy has disappeared?  If no near peer 
competitor should arise, what strategic purpose will the U.S. Navy's current force 
structure serve?  How should it be modified or altered to best serve evolving strategic 
interests and national security needs in the era of global terrorism and regional conflict?
3. Near-Term and Mid-Term Transformation Challenges
As recently stated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “You go to war 
with the [military] you have, not the [military] you might want or wish to have at a later 
5time.”3  This statement perfectly describes the U.S. Navy's current predicament. If the 
current fleet is not suitable to the task at hand, then the Navy has three options: change 
the force structure of the fleet, change the mission, or find some acceptable combination 
of the two.  Any effort to change the force structure will undoubtedly confront numerous 
obstacles, including limited resources and funding, competing interests, institutional 
biases, and time.  Unfortunately for the U.S. Navy, the Global War on Terrorism has 
simultaneously demonstrated the need to transform the fleet while eroding the budgetary 
resources needed to accomplish this goal.
This chapter will examine the various near-term and short-term programs and 
platforms outlined in the Navy's Transformation Roadmap and evaluate their 
implementation.  Specific attention will be paid to research and development timelines, 
procurement and operational costs, and analysis of how well these initiatives support and 
enable the Navy's stated strategic vision.  If the platforms and programs are either 
unattainable or do not support the strategic vision, then the Roadmap is flawed and will 
never be able to achieve the Navy's goals.  From a budgetary standpoint, vision is much 
easier to change than platforms, which again leads back to the trap of the fleet dictating 
the strategy rather than the strategy driving the composition and capabilities of the fleet.
4. Long-Term Transformation Challenges
Anti-access and area denial capabilities of future adversaries are of huge concern 
to the U.S. Navy in terms of guaranteeing forcible entry and continuous support 
capabilities.  Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver provide the core components of 
the Navy's long-term transformation vision.  This chapter will evaluate the feasibility of 
these concepts, the technologies and platforms necessary to bring these capabilities to the 
fleet, and the potential liabilities such an effort would entail.
5. Conclusions
This chapter will summarize the findings of this thesis about the viability of the 
Navy's Transformation Roadmap, the implications for naval strategy, and the underlying 
logic of both. The conclusion of the chapter will include recommendations based upon 
these findings.  
3 Rodgers, J., 2004. "Locals weigh in on Rumsfeld comments." New Hampshire Public Radio 
webpage. Accessed 28 January 2004, available from: http://www .nhpr.org/view_content/7805/; Internet.
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7II. ON NAVAL STRATEGY
A. THE INFLUENCE OF MAHANIAN SEA POWER UPON HISTORY
No name resounds through the annals of naval strategy like that of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan.  After entering the U.S. Naval Academy against the advice of his father and 
graduating second in his class in 1859,4 Mahan ironically never fully embraced nor 
enjoyed the profession for which he would later become the greatest advocate.  Mahan, in 
fact, detested the steam powered reality of his own naval era and demonstrated himself to 
be a mostly unremarkable career naval officer who, despite 37 years of service, never 
fought, planned, or participated in any major naval battle or campaign.5 For all his 
professed love of sea power and the Navy, Mahan much preferred the study of naval 
combat as opposed to its practice, the classroom rather than the quarterdeck, and the 
Presidency of the Naval War College instead of command of a naval vessel.  In short, 
throughout much of his career, Mahan evidenced an aversion to sea duty of any kind.6
Although Mahan may not have loved the life of a naval officer at sea, he certainly 
did admire his service and made every effort to contribute to its continued success and 
wellbeing.  Fortune smiled upon both service and service member when Mahan 
discovered his vocation upon arriving at the newly established Naval War College at 
Newport Rhode Island in 1886.  The seven years Mahan spent there as both President and 
lecturer would catapult him to levels of success, influence, and recognition well beyond 
his contemporaries and critics.7 The Influence of Sea Power upon History, the first, and 
by far the most famous, of Mahan's 20 published books was published in 1890, becoming 
an international success8 – especially in England, Germany, and Japan where the full 
embracement and entrenchment of modified Mahanian logic would directly contribute to 
4 Crowl, P.A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Makers of Modern Strategy: from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 445.
5 Lehman, J.F., On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy.




8the unprecedented naval arms races in which they competed first from approximately 
1897 to 19149 and then again from approximately 1921 to 1940.10
B. A FLAWED THEORY IMPROPERLY APPLIED
The success and popularity of Mahan's theories really cannot be credited as either 
original or balanced thinking.  While Mahan's writings were commonly cited as 
justification to build great navies, they did more to substantiate and support existing 
biases than to create them.  In the case of early 20th century naval arms races, Great 
Britain and the United States were the only nations with any substantial military naval 
history.  Japan and Germany were effectively both seduced into developing their own 
navies as a means of countering their rivals and as a means for enhancing their national 
and international prestige.11 This was precisely Mahan's point – navies offered a ticket to 
national greatness and prosperity.  On the level of fleet configurations, however, Mahan's 
actual opinions and recommendations were completely ignored by those who claimed to 
be his disciples.  During the period between 1905 and 1906, President Roosevelt opted 
against following Mahan's advice and developed a fleet of hyper-expensive capital ships 
rather than a more balanced fleet of limited battleships supported by frigates.12  Kaiser 
Wilhelm also employed selective interpretations of Mahan's works to justify Germany's 
crash construction program to build a fleet of battleships to counter Great Britain's
growing fleet of battleships. Germany's program flew in the face of Mahan's prescription 
against dominant land powers attempting to develop into dominating sea powers.13
Beyond the distortion and selective application of his theories, an even greater 
weakness to Mahanian logic exists: his inability to properly analyze the historical lessons
used to back up his arguments.14  While there can be no doubt that sea power played a 
critical role in the events he recounted, it was never the decisive element he claimed.  For
9 Kennedy, P.M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.  (New York: Humanity Books, 1998), 
214-229.
10 Love, R.W. Jr., History of the U.S. Navy Volume One: 1775-1941. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 530-540.
11 Symonds, C.L., Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 119-
121.
12 Leyman, 2001, 197-199.
13 Ibid, 2001, 195-196.
14 Crowl, 1986, 449-455.
9example, Mahan accredited the ultimate defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte to Lord Nelson's 
victory at Trafalgar.  While there can be no doubt that this victory granted Great Britain 
control of the seas which it then used to weaken France through economic strangulation,
the actual defeat of Napoleon was achieved through land-based campaigns.  Historian 
Phillip Crowl criticizes Mahan's treatment of the Napoleonic Wars, citing how his 
explanation of events omits any consideration of:
the disastrous failure of Bonaparte's Russian campaign, the "war of 
liberation," the battle of Leipzig where the French lost nearly 300,000 
troops, and of course the final catastrophe at Waterloo.  In these events, it 
was the clash of armies, not "far distant, storm-beaten ships," that decided 
the issue.15
In reality, Mahan misapplied history to the study of strategy and, in this way, 
misled several generations of naval theorists.  
C. THE ROLE OF SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR I
Although the influence of Mahanian logic directly contributed to the character 
and composition of World War I era fleets, the naval engagements and strategies used 
primarily throughout this war were starkly anti-Mahanian in nature.  Mahanian strategy, 
borrowing largely from the ideas and writings of Swiss strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini, 
extol the virtues of climactic fleet actions intended to destroy the enemy fleet, or at least 
drive it from the sea, and thus achieve control of the seas.16  Contrary to Mahan's 
prescriptions, the vast majority of World War I naval combat consisted of the very type 
of guerre de course hit and run warfare he vehemently opposed.  For example, Germany
made virtually no use of its capital ships and instead pursued control of the seas in favor 
of denial of the seas by unleashing massive unrestricted U-Boat attacks against 
commercial shipping.17
Despite an early and lasting repugnance for "defensive strategies," the British and 
American fleets dedicated the vast majority of their wartime activity to escorting 
merchant shipping, fighting the German U-Boats, and blockading the German fleet.18
15 Crowl, 1986, 452-454
16 Ibid, 456-457.
17 Symonds, 1995, 128.
18 Love, History of the U.S. Navy Volume One,  479-515.
10
While this type of naval strategy may have been less glamorous and more tedious than 
the U.S. or British Navies may have desired, it was of far more utilitarian and beneficial 
than the glorious fleet engagements of which every naval officer dreamed.  This 
predominant attitude of "evade battle until victory is certain" all but ensured no great fleet 
engagement would occur.  When the possibility actually presented itself at Jutland, 
neither side pressed the fight for fear they would destroy their prized fleets and have 
nothing to show for it.19  For all its fame, the Battle of Jutland represented an indecisive 
stalemate from which both sides could claim victory – the Germans because they had 
inflicted twice the amount of damages and losses on the British, and the British because 
they had succeeded in blocking the German fleet and isolating it within its home waters 
where it posed no threat and had little, if any, strategic value.20 Amazingly, neither the 
success of the submarine as an implement of economic warfare, nor the failure of capital 
ships to achieve control of the seas would be remembered as the chief lessons of the war.  
Quite to the contrary, despite these lessons, the Battleship remained the sweetheart of the 
fleet while the submarine was still looked upon as a novelty.21  It would take another 
world war and many more casualties before the new reality of naval combat became 
widely recognized.
D. THE ROLE OF SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR II 
By the time the United States entered World War II, its fleet, constrained by the 
Washington Conference of 1921 and the Five Power Treaty, continued to be comprised 
primarily of capital ships despite increased numbers of aircraft carriers and submarines 
which were relegated to screening support for their larger counterparts.22  Interwar 
training, war plans, and war games, especially in the Pacific, remained almost exclusively 
oriented toward battleship employment in glorious fleet on fleet engagements aimed at 
destroying the enemy's fleet, despite the marked rarity of this type of naval combat.  
Mahanian logic still held sway within the U.S. Navy.  According to Crowl, 
19 Kennedy, 1998, 246-247.
20 Brooks, R., "Storm of Steel 1914-1916" in Atlas of World Military History, ed. Richard Brooks. 
(New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2000), 164-165.
21 Symonds, 1995, 132.
22 Ibid, 137-138.
11
though the participation of aircraft carriers was assumed, the tactical 
climax of [these simulations] was always a fight between fleets of 
battleships.  None of these games envisioned a final invasion or aerial 
bombardment of Japan; the mission ended with the establishment of an 
economic blockade by the victorious U.S. Navy.23
Not all strategists believed in the primacy of the battleship.  A series of fleet 
exercises conducted during the interwar period demonstrated the potential of carrier born 
aviation to function as the decisive element of sea power.  Those rejecting the primacy of 
the battleship pointed to the Fleet Problem XIX exercise, which simulated a devastating 
Japanese air strike against Pearl Harbor three years in advance of the actual event.24
Unfortunately, these exercises were seen as novelties, and the full potential of the U.S. 
submarine and aircraft carrier forces remained largely unrecognized or ignored until after 
the bulk of the Pacific Fleet was destroyed on 7 December 1941.
After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy had no alternative but to revise its naval 
strategy and prosecute the war with the only available resources: submarines, which in 
typical Mahanian fashion had been ignored by the Japanese during the attack, and aircraft 
carriers, which had fortunately been away from Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck.25
Deprived of its primary weapon, the U.S. Navy had little recourse but to initiate 
unrestricted submarine warfare throughout the Pacific and husband its aircraft carriers 
until such time as the fleet could be reconstituted as an offensive force.  This task took
several months during which the Japanese, mostly unopposed, expanded and consolidated 
their control over the Pacific.26  It was not until the Battle of Guadalcanal in August 
1942, that the Pacific Fleet emerged as a balanced offensive naval force, and even then,
its centerpiece consisted of three aircraft carriers supported by only one battleship.27
This type of tactical hierarchy would remain the norm as the battleship became more and 
more of a support platform, providing air defense for carriers during over the horizon sea
23 Crowl, 1986, 475.
24 History of the USS SARATOGA (CV 3). 2005. Chief of Naval Operations webpage. Accessed 16 
November 2005, available from: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/carriers/histories/cv03-
saratoga/cv03-saratoga.html; Internet.
25 Symonds, 1995, 140.
26 Ibid, 142-146.
27 Love, R.W. Jr., History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two: 1942-1992. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 42-43.
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engagements fought primarily between formations of ships and enemy air wings and 
naval gunfire support operations during amphibious landings.28
The war at sea in the Atlantic from 1941 to 1945 turned out to resemble, in one 
important aspect at least, the struggle waged between 1914 and 1918, but on a far larger 
scale.29  The sinking of the HMS HOOD notwithstanding, Germany again proved 
incapable of achieving any significant victory over Allied naval forces and resorted to 
unrestricted U-Boat warfare aimed at crippling Great Britain's ability to sustain its war 
effort.30  Capital ships proved to be mostly irrelevant during the Battle for the Atlantic 
and European theatre of combat, with the noted exception of providing naval gunfire 
support operations during the amphibious assault operations,31 as smaller, more 
maneuverable ships proved more adaptable to the myriad of operations required.32
E. THE ROLE OF SEA POWER IN THE COLD WAR
The U.S. Navy found itself in uncharted waters when World War II finally came 
to a close in 1945.  After the war, the fleet possessed more ships and sailors than in any
other period in its history and had decimated one great naval power while outpacing the 
sea denial war of attrition strategy of another.33 Without an adversary to challenge the 
U.S. Navy's control of the seas, the Navy found itself facing a new type of struggle: a 
fight with the newly established U.S. Air Force over resources and funding that quickly
came to threaten the continued existence of the very fleet which the Navy's leadership 
maintained (in true Mahanian fashion) had been the deciding factor during the war in the 
Pacific.34
Although the Air Force found great success in spreading its new strategic 
bombing religion, the Navy successfully maintained much of its force structure, 
especially its naval aviation assets, and struggled to find a meaningful role in the 
28 Love, R.W. Jr., History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two, 235-237, & 261-263.
29 Symonds, 1995, 156.
30 Isby, D., "The Zenith of 'Modern War' 1939-1945" in Atlas of World Military History, ed. Richard 
Brooks. ((New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2000), 210-211.
31 Love, History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two, 164-167.
32 Ibid, 100-101.
33 Baer, G.W., One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 275-279.
34 Baer, 1993, 275-280.
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blossoming nuclear age.  Not surprisingly, the new naval strategy which emerged was not 
really that different from what it had been before.  The new strategy played to the 
existing strengths of the Navy's fleet, its inherent mobility, and rising suspicions of the 
Soviet Union.  In short, the U.S. Navy found its salvation in the form of the forward 
deployed battle group.35  This new (yet old) concept was reborn out of circumstance in 
February 1946 when President Truman dispatched the USS MISSOURI and a group of 
escorts to the Mediterranean Sea as a show of force aimed at deterring aggression 
between Turkey and Greece.36  This deployment was followed-up in August 1946 with 
the deployment of the USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, the world's largest aircraft 
carrier, to the eastern Mediterranean Sea as a show of force intended to deter a potential 
Soviet invasion of Turkey.37
The Navy bankrolled the success of these deployments into a revised naval 
strategy of deterrence through continuous forward deployment around the world.  This 
strategy further buoyed its position against Air Force strategic bombing doctrine by 
providing a close range, relatively sustainable air strike capability.38  Not only could 
Navy battle groups operate for extended periods in close proximity to a potential 
adversary, they could do so with little or no theatre land-based support and offered the 
flexibility of worldwide redeployment.  The success of these first few Mediterranean 
deployments was so well received that the Navy established an entirely forward deployed 
Mediterranean command structure in January 1948, which later became the 6th Fleet.39
Ironically, the revitalization of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean would also 
impel and encourage the Soviet Union to build its own navy – allowing both sides to 
adopt and justify a series of mutually reinforcing Mahanian strategies.40  Like Germany
in two wars before them, the Soviet Union, clearly the dominant land power in Europe, 
selectively interpreted Mahan's prescriptions and sought to make itself into a dominant
35 Love, History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two, 283-285. 
36 Baer, 1993, 282-283.
37 Ibid.
38 Symonds, 1995, 191-192.
39 Love, History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two, 284-285.
40 Malia, M., The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991. (New York: The Free 
Press, 1994), 371.
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sea power as well - regardless of the fact it had no real strategic need to do so.  As a
mostly self-sustaining entity and the largest territorial power in both Europe and Asia, the 
Soviet Union had little to gain strategically and much to loose monetarily in developing a 
deep water naval capacity similar to that already possessed by the United States.  The one 
noted exception to the Soviet Unions strategically questionable attempt to build a world-
class navy, was the development a submarine force that eventually became its most 
credible strategic asset with the development of the nuclear powered ballistic missile 
submarine.41
As the Cold War progressed, the Soviet Navy became a worthy opponent for the 
U.S. Navy, one used by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman to justify the creation of a
600 ship navy.  Lehman's dream fleet consisted of some 15 carrier battle groups, 4 
battleship battle groups, 250 various cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, 100 attack 
submarines, 40 ballistic missile submarines, and enough amphibious operations ships to 
land 2 entire Marine amphibious brigades.42  In the event of war with the Soviet Union, 
what became known as "The Maritime Strategy" dictate that the U.S. Navy would use its 
600 ship fleet to sweep the Soviet Navy from the seas and attack the very heart of the 
Soviet Union's submarine fleets on the Kola Peninsula.  Once the Soviet Navy had been 
eliminated, an amphibious landing force, along with pre-staged land components in 
Europe, would catch the Soviet Army in a giant pincher movement and destroy them in 
detail.43 The Soviet economy would later collapse under the strain of its military 
expenditures, a great deal of which had been dedicated to building a world-class Navy.  
By the time the Cold War came to an end in 1989, the U.S. Navy had not quite achieved 
its 600 ship goal.44
F. THE ROLE OF SEA POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
ENVIRONMENT
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era eerily similar to that of the late 1940's: 
the Navy once again emerged victorious from a long and hard fought military 
41 Grove, E., The Future of Sea Power. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 94-95, 133-138.
42 Lehman, 2001, 360-364.
43 Lehman, 2001, 360-364.
44 Naval History Center, 2005, Maritime Business Strategies webpage. Accessed 10 January 2005, 
available from: http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/ statistics/force.htm; Internet.
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engagement with a powerful and threatening enemy, only to find itself facing an even 
more challenging political struggle to justify its continued existence.45  While in the 
1950’s the emergence of a strong and threatening Soviet Navy would revitalize the U.S. 
Navy and obviate criticisms of its obsolescence and irrelevance,46 history would prove to 
be less accommodating in the 1990’s.  Despite all of the predictions and warnings based 
largely upon entrenched Mahanian logic, a near peer naval competitor continuously failed 
to emerge on the Navy’s horizon.
By 1992, the overall U.S. defense budget had been reduced by twenty-five 
percent as compared to that of 1985, imparting terrible repercussions to all branches of 
the military, but to the Navy in particular.47 Contrary to the Navy’s long term strategic 
planning, President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney ordered 
the decommissioning of nearly 100 vessels over the course of just two years, reducing the 
Navy’s total number of commissioned vessels from 570 in 1990 to only 471 in 1992 (see 
Table 1 below).48  Over the 1990’s, the Navy’s leadership scrambled to find justification 
to prevent any additional fleet reductions.  Eventually, the Navy’s ultimate defense would 
come to be embodied in a single, powerful buzzword, which has come to dominate U.S. 
naval thinking, writing, and planning ever since: “Transformation.”  
During the early 1990's, transformation was a somewhat nebulous and vague 
concept.  As the Navy’s leadership would discover, the decision to initiate transformation 
would prove to be far easier than determining exactly how the service should be 
transformed.  In September 1992, the Navy published a strategy statement entitled From 
the Sea, which, over the course of only 10 pages, included no less than 18 references to 
“new” initiatives aimed at revitalizing the Navy.49  Two years later, this strategic 
guidance was updated and reissued as Forward . . . From the Sea, outlining an additional 
45 Baer, G.W., One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 289-292.
46 Ibid.
47 Love, R.W. Jr., History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two: 1942-1991. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 801.
48 Naval History Center, 2005, Internet.
49 O’Keefe, S., Kelso, F. B., and Mundy, C. E. Jr. 1992 ".  . . .From the Sea: Preparing the Naval 
Service for the 21st Century." Chief of Naval Information webpage. Accessed 20 March 2005, available 
from: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib /policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt: Internet.
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4 “new” initiatives and 12 subsequent “shifts” of focus intended to fine-tune the guidance 
provided in the former directive.50 While certainly welcomed by nations and peoples all 
over the world, the post-Cold War “peace dividend” posed an especially troubling 
proposition for the United States Navy as it struggled to justify its continued existence in 
the absence of a powerful, capable, and, most importantly from a budgetary standpoint, a 
readily apparent competitor.51  When no such challenger emerged after the decline of the 
Soviet Navy, Mahanian logic, creative reasoning, and extrapolation were used to imply 
competition where none existed.52
Table 1. U.S. Navy Force Structure since World War II (After Naval History Center, 2005,
Maritime Business Strategies webpage. Accessed 10 January 2005, available from: 
http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/ statistics/force.htm; Internet.)
50 Dalton, J.H., Borda, J.M., and Mundy, C.E. Jr. 1994. "Forward . . . From the Sea." Chief of Naval 
Information webpage.  Accessed 20 March 2005, available from: http://www.chinfo.navy.miln 
/navpalib/policy/fromsea/forward.txt; Internet.
51 Lehman, J., On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy.
(New York: The Free Press, 2001), 400-401.
52 Barnett, T.P.M., The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. (New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 67-79.
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Conventional wisdom at the time dictated that war planning and force structure 
were driven by threat based analysis, meaning the Navy should structure itself to confront 
the most powerful threat it might be called upon to address.  As had been the case 
throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Navy provided the obvious standard against which 
its force structure had been designed.53  The Achilles heel of this type of “threat based” 
analysis was that it concentrated solely on the principal threat (the Soviet Union) while 
glossing over the “lesser included” threats (everything other than the Soviet Union), 
assuming “that if we built [a force structure] for the Big One, then that same mix of 
forces would adequately handle all the smaller threats, but not vice versa.”54  In the early 
1990’s, recognizing the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States Navy considered what 
type of force structure it needed in a post-Cold War security environment.  This resulted
in what has become known as the Manthorpe Curve (see Figure 1 below): a graphic 
depiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence’s (ONI) future threat prediction.55
Figure 1.  The Manthorpe Curve (From: Barnett, T.P.M. 2004. Thomas P.M. Barnett 
webpage.  Accessed 30 January 2004, available from: http://www. 
thomaspmbarnett. com/pnm/manthorpe _curve.htm; Internet.)
ONI predicted the decline of the Soviet Union would occur gradually over the 
course of about 10 years and that the threat it had presented would be replaced sometime 




around the year 2000 by a then undetermined global “near-peer” competitor.  ONI 
identified these near pear threats as China, North Korea, or possibly even a reconstituted 
Soviet/Russian threat.56  Also depicted was a lower, yet steadily increasing Rest of the 
World (ROW) threat, commonly referred to as the “lesser includeds,” which represented 
the growing regional threats and instabilities ONI predicted would arise as the United 
States and Soviet Union scaled back their global military presence.57
The significance of the Manthorpe Curve is readily apparent: it envisioned a 
future threat environment that would be very similar, if not identical, to the one the 
Navy’s force structure had been built to defeat.  Using the Manthorpe Curve’s prediction, 
the Navy justified strategic, planning, and programmatic decisions aimed at maintaining
its preexisting force structure.58  Unfortunately, by concentrating solely on the premise of 
a rising near peer competitor, ONI and the Navy’s leadership inadvertently served to 
perpetuate an increasingly obsolete Cold War mentality based on entrenched Mahanian 
logic: one which would unintentionally handicap the Navy’s ability to address the 
growing number of “lesser included” emerging world threats which did not exhibit the 
same form, capabilities, or intentions as its former Soviet adversary.59
As the 20th Century came to a close, the Navy found itself waging two separate
(yet not entirely new) campaigns: (1) an internal, intellectual debate to determine what 
type of force structure would be most beneficial in the post-Cold War security 
environment; and (2) an external struggle to maintain solvency and relevance in an era of 
rapidly increasing procurement and operational costs.  The overlap and interaction 
between these two campaigns resulted in a series of plans and programs aimed at 
satisfying the Navy's need to update its platforms, refine its organization, and develop 
new strategies to operate in the new security environment.  The most recent iteration of 
this planning is provided by the Navy's Transformation Roadmap of 2003, in which the 
Navy outlines a series of progressive initiatives aimed at reorganizing the fleet in the 
short-term while simultaneously transforming itself, over the long term, into a force 
56 Cohen, W.S. 1997. "Quadrennial Defense Review." Defense Link webpage.  Accessed 16 February 
2005, available from: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/ index.html; Internet.
57 Barnett, 2004, 69.
58 O’Keefe, Kelso, and Mundy, 1992, Internet.
59 Barnett, 2004, 76-77.
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capable of flourishing in the dynamic security environment envisioned by the 2001 
Department of Defense (DoD) Quadrennial Defense Force Review (QDR) Report and 
Joint Vision 2020.
G. THE NAVY'S CURRENT STRATEGIC DILEMMA
In direct comparison with its sister services, the platforms which make up the U.S. 
Navy's fleet are extremely expensive, have much longer life-cycles, take years to build, 
and exhibit far less ability to be modified in order to undertake missions they were never
designed to address.  Although important to all military branches, long term strategic 
vision and careful planning is even more critical for the Navy because initiatives 
undertaken in the present tend to have very little, if any, impact on the strategic value of 
the current force, but will wholly dictate the missions and capabilities of the fleet which 
will sail years into the future.  Given this understanding it is not hard to understand how 
for the last fifteen years the Navy has struggled with its near impossible burden: 
developing a cohesive and viable naval strategy to addresses a radically altered and 
quickly evolving threat environment while retaining the ability to implement and execute 
the elected strategy despite the strategic constraints of the preexisting fleet.  
In a very real sense, the Navy finds itself being pulled in every direction at once,
trying to satisfy increasing operational commitments, ensure long term readiness, 
maintain an adequate force structure, design and procure replacement platforms, and to 
ensure all of these efforts support the current strategy while providing a bridge to the 
future strategy, whatever it may actually turn out to be 20 years into the future.  The 
Navy's ability to satisfy these competing interests has been severely restricted by 
reductions in the purchasing power of its budget, a reality which is inescapable and 
unlikely to change anytime in the near future.  The Bush Administration has succeeded in 
achieving billions of dollars in supplemental defense appropriations during the last three 
years, but this increased spending has been used to address the staggering costs of 
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  None of this supplemental spending has 
made any impact on the Navy’s ability to overcome the realities of its strategic and 
procurement dilemma.
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III. NEAR-TERM AND MID-TERM 
TRANSFORMATION CHALLENGES
A. A TRANSFORMATION THAT NEVER FULLY MATERIALIZED
The Navy maintained a mostly steady course through the 1990's, convinced a 
rising near peer competitor would eventually emerge, yet it still made a substantial effort 
to consider the viability of new strategies and encouraged debate within its various 
communities as to the future force structure.  While, on one hand, this type of 
intercommunity debate and competition plays a healthy and necessary role in ensuring 
the Navy pursues the best and most suitable strategic course of action, it can also be 
detrimental to the long term well being of the force – especially in times of decreased 
military spending which inevitably results in inter-service competition for resources.  
During such periods of budgetary famine, those programs which can be best justified and 
explained in terms relative costs and benefits and framed within an overarching strategy 
have the best chance of survival while those which fail to achieve or sustain widespread 
support wither and die in increasing numbers.  This cycle tells the tale of naval 
transformation in post-Cold War era.  
Over the course of the 1990’s, the Navy generated thousands of articles, concepts, 
directives, plans, and studies which considered and debated the various merits of naval 
transformation.  But despite all of this transformational writing, very few of these 
concepts could generate the momentum and support necessary to make the leap from the 
drawing board to the fleet.  As a point of illustration, from the period of 1990 to the 
present date three new combatant vessel designs entered fleet service: the Arleigh Burke 
Class Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG 51 Class), the Seawolf Class Nuclear Attack 
Submarine (SSN 21 Class), and the Virginia Class Nuclear Attack Submarine (SSN 774 
Class).60 While three new combatant platforms in 15 years may seem like a good record, 
it must be remembered that the research, development, and procurement of two of these 
vessels, the Arleigh Burke Class DDG and Seawolf Class SSN, was completed prior to 
60 Global Security Organization. 2005. Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 10 January 
2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/systems/ship/index.html; Internet.
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the conclusion of the Cold War.61  Additionally, while more than 40 Arleigh Burke Class 
DDG’s are currently active in the fleet, only three Seawolf Class SSN’s and one Virginia 
Class SSN have been added to the Navy’s active duty inventory.62  In practical terms, this 
means that of the 288 U.S. Navy ships in active commission,63 only 16% of the total 
force represents designs incorporated after the end of the Cold War, with far less than 1%
of the total force having been designed after the fall of the Soviet Union.  It is sobering to 
consider that approximately 70% of the active duty navy has been in commission for 
more than 15 years, over half of the professed 33 year life-cycle expectancy of a modern 
warship, and also that a full 99% majority of the Navy’s current force structure represents 
Cold War security planning and procurement initiatives.64
B. TRANSFORMATION IN THE FLEET
Although an analysis considering only these platform statistics might seem to 
indicate the Navy has completely “failed” to transform itself over the last 15 years, this is 
not entirely true.  The Navy successfully fielded, and is continuing to implement, some of 
its “transformational” initiatives.  However, a large portion of these near to mid term 
efforts in reality represent nothing more than stop-gap measures aimed at bridging the 
growing divide between the Navy’s ever increasing number of new missions and its 
legacy platforms.65 A case in point is the recently implemented Fleet Response Plan 
(FRP) which has made significant modifications in terms of fleet training and 
certification in order to allow greater flexibility in ship employment cycles and to ensure 
greater numbers of fleet formations are available for responding to rapidly emerging 
security contingencies.66  Instead of deploying 12 rigidly configured carrier battle group 
(CVBG) formations, the FRP offers increased flexibility by redistributing existing 
formations into infinitely configurable formations consisting of up to 12 carrier strike 
61 Love, 2002, 801 and Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
62 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
63 Status of the U.S. Navy. 2005.  Chief of Naval Information webpage. Accessed 24 March 2005, 
available from: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/ www/status.html; Internet.
64 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
65 "Transforming the Navy’s Surface Combatant Force," Global Security Organization webpage. 
Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ library/report/
cbo/tnscf_may03.htm; Internet.
66 "Fleet Response Plan," 2005. Global Security Organization webpage.  Accessed 17 November 
2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/frp.htm; Internet.
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groups (CSG's), in essence scaled-down CVBG's, as many surface action groups (SAG's), 
independent groups of surface combatants, and/or expeditionary strike groups (ESG's), 
amphibious assault formations supported by surface combatant escorts, as necessary to 
address tactical needs as determined by the specific tactical and strategic situation.67
Implementation of the FRP marks a significant departure for the Navy in terms of 
how it organizes and employs its fleet formations. However, this type of change has very 
little impact on the strategic utility of the fleet in being.  Reorganization is not the same 
as altering the composition of the fleet itself in order for any significant transformation to 
meet a new strategy.  No amount of reorganization will alter the stark fact that while the 
platforms which comprise the vast majority of the Navy's current fleet would be perfectly 
capable of meeting a Soviet style force in direct combat, they are much less suited to 
undertake the peacekeeping and stability operations the Navy finds itself being tasked 
with.  Furthermore, the current fleet structure remains unsuited to fight in the shallow
littoral environment into which an increasing number of its potential adversaries have 
retreated.68
An overwhelming amount of research and debate fueled the transformation 
bubble of the 1990’s, but most of the actual concepts envisioned during this period 
simply fizzled out and died, falling victim to either shrinking procurement budgets or 
rapidly changing strategic priorities.69  In example, DD 21, billed as the destroyer to lead 
the Navy into the 21st century died on the drawing board long before the new century 
dawned, only to be revived later and re-designated DDX.  Regardless of its rejuvenation, 
the “land attack destroyer” remains a highly contested, debated, and uncertain project that 
has yet to advance beyond the research and design stage of development70 – costing 
hundreds of millions of dollars of research and development funding which could have 
been used to advance other programs and initiatives.
67 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
68 Marx, P.H. "Barbarians at the Gate." U.S. Naval Institute webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, 
available from: http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles04/PRO05marx.htm; Internet.
69 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
70 Federation of American Scientists. 2005. Federation of American Scientists Webpage. Accessed 06 
March 2005, available from: http://www.fas.org/man/ dod-101/sys/ship/index.html; Internet.
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Littoral combat was another post-Cold War transformational priority espoused 
throughout both . . .From the Sea71 and Forward . . . From the Sea.72  Unfortunately, the 
“streetfighter” concept intended to rectify the Navy’s “brown water” deficiencies did not 
even fare as well or develop as far as DD 21.73  The “arsenal ship,” envisioned as a high-
capacity Tomahawk cruise missile and Naval Gunfire Support strike platform, was the 
Navy’s last great stillborn concept of 1990’s, which, like all of its transformational 
siblings, not only failed to enter fleet service, but also never even made it off the drawing 
board.74  While it is readily apparent the Navy expended a tremendous amount of time, 
effort, and money considering, evaluating, and debating various transformational 
initiatives throughout the 1990’s, its inability to translate these efforts into new platforms 
have resulted in little, if any, real change in terms of the fleets composition or 
capabilities.
C. THE TRANSITION FROM THREAT BASED TO CAPABILITIES BASED 
MILITARY PLANNING
Over the course of the Cold War the U.S. Navy benefited greatly from the relative 
stability of the security environment and its existing fleet is the collective result of some 
fifty years of incremental strategic planning and preparation aimed at defeating the Soviet 
Navy in fleet combat on the high seas.  Paradoxically, the benefits and liabilities resulting 
from such an extended period of relative stability were neither readily apparent to nor 
fully appreciated until after the confrontation came to a close.  While the Cold War era 
provided the Navy a fairly well defined arena of competition, a clear understanding as to 
capabilities and limitations of the enemy's forces, and a somewhat consistent notion as to 
how to best structure its own forces to counteract these characteristics, the post-Cold War 
security environment has proven to be anything but stable and consistent.  In the absence 
of a readily apparent opponent, the Navy has struggled to determine how to proceed: 
should the fleet remain the same or should it be modified and if so, how?  
Although these same questions still linger, the 1997 QDR outlined DoD’s efforts 
to facilitate a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) intended to harness the technological 
71 O’keefe, Kelso, and Mundy, 1994, Internet.
72 Dalton, Borda, and Mundy, 1994, Internet.
73 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
74 Federation of American Scientists webpage, 2005, Internet.
25
power of communication and information systems and use them as a springboard to 
leapfrog ahead of potential adversaries.75 Unfortunately, the DoD neither completely 
realized nor capitalized on its intended technological RMA by the time of the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review.  Although not entirely dead, the RMA became increasingly
overshadowed by the emerging notion of capabilities based military planning.76
Unlike the threat based planning espoused by the Manthorpe Curve, which 
ignored anything and everything beyond the primary threat, capabilities based planning 
seeks to establish a military force structure capable of defeating a broad range of 
adversarial capabilities rather than simply leveraging technology to defeat one specific 
threat, i.e. the Soviet Union or the nebulous near peer competitor.77 For all its apparent 
logic and professed strengths, however, capabilities based planning has one critical 
weakness: although it considers a range of adversarial capabilities, the individual services 
retain an inherent ability to determine which specific capabilities they intend to address 
within the overall identified range.  For the Navy, with its long life-cycle fleet and 
overwhelming number of legacy platforms, this has resulted in an unintentional reversal 
of prerogatives: a strategy designed to accommodate the limitations of existing platforms 
rather than platforms designed to accommodate the requirements of an overarching 
strategy.  
Surprisingly, the DoD’s incorporation of capabilities based planning would 
ultimately serve to revive or revitalize many of the transformational concepts and 
platforms which had been considered during the course of the 1990’s, even though most 
of their new iterations would bear only a casual resemblance to their predecessors.  For 
the Navy this meant a return to ideas that first surfaced during the early 1990’s.  For 
example, the Arsenal ship is no longer a ship, but has resurfaced as a cadre of four 
converted Ohio Class Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines, each of which are in the 
process of trading in their 24 Trident missiles in exchange for 154 Tomahawk cruise 
75 Cohen, 1997, Internet.
76 Rumsfeld, D.H. 2001. "Quadrennial Defense Review." Commonwealth Institute Webpage. 
Accessed 10 March 2005, available from: http://www.comw.org /qdr/qdr2001.pdf;Internet.
77 Davis, P.K. n.d. "Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, 
and Transformation." Rand Corporation webpage. Accessed 02 March 2005, available from: 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/ MR1513 /MR1513.pdf; Internet
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Missiles and 66 Navy Seals.78  Streetfighter has been resurrected as the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS), an all-purpose, high-speed vessel equipped with unmanned, remote 
controlled mission packages and intended to give the Navy a dedicated “brown water” 
littoral fighting capability.79  DD 21 has been re-designated as DDX and, although 
research and design continues, no substantial progress has been made to advance this 
program beyond its continuing research and development phase.80
Taken at face value, the adoption of capabilities based planning aimed at a range 
of potential capabilities would appear to be a breath of fresh air in terms of force planning 
and procurement; however, the subsequent everything that’s old is new again 
rejuvenation of many of these leftover transformational initiatives seems to contradict 
this notion.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine how two such radically different approaches 
to force planning could result in almost identical prescriptions in terms of necessary 
programs and platforms – especially since no other nation in the world is building or 
operating a primarily deepwater capital ship fleet.  Regardless of which type of threat 
planning is used to justify its initiatives, the Navy appears intent on maintaining those 
core competencies and platforms it feels most comfortable with: aircraft carriers, deep-
draft capital ships, and deep-diving nuclear submarines.
D. THE FRUSTRATING EXAMPLE OF DD (21)
The Navy’s most ambitions effort towards fielding a new surface combatant 
platform has been the DD (X). It is also the most resounding example of naval 
transformation gone awry.  Originally conceived as DD (21) in the mid 1990’s and 
designated the ZUMWALT Class, in honor of former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Elmo R. "Bud" Zumwalt Jr.,81 the platform touted as the “21st century destroyer”82 failed 
78 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
79 "Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Operations." 2003. Global Security Organization Webpage. 
Accessed 10 January 2005, available from: http://www. globalsecurity.org /military/library
/report/2003/LCSCONOPS.htm; Internet.
80 Global Security Organization webpage, 2005, Internet.
81 "President Names New Ship Class After Adm. Zumwalt," Federation of American Scientists 
webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/
docs/000705-dd21-zumwalt.htm; Internet.
82 Murphy, D. J. Jr., Memorandum for Program Executive Officer for Surface Combatants, Federation 
of American Scientists website. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/docs/971217-21st.htm; Internet.
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to even last out the 20th century in which it was conceived.  Research and development 
cost overruns, overambitious propulsion systems specifications, and wild swings in 
strategic vision all conspired against the project leading to its eventual scuttling in 2001.83
Although disappointing to those closest to the project, the cancellation of DD (21) 
was probably a blessing in disguise.  Had the ZUMWALT Class made it into fleet 
service, it would have probably faired little better than the SEAWOLF Class Nuclear 
Attack Submarine, which proved to be nothing more than an exponentially higher priced 
platform with almost identical capabilities as the vessel it was intended to replace.84
Despite the cancellation of DD (21), the Navy was determined to roll many of the ideas 
and technologies envisioned for DD (21) into a new “land attack” platform, which it 
designated DD (X).85  Beyond the DD (X) platform itself, the Navy designated the still 
undeveloped destroyer as the lead vessel in its Future Surface Combatant (FSC) family, 
intending to capitalize on its basic hull, engineering systems, and sensor designs and use 
them as a foundation for the spiral development of a follow-on generation of cruisers (CG 
(X)), amphibious ships (LHA (R)), and aircraft carriers (CVN 21).86
Amidst these efforts to create follow-on replacements for its current surface 
combatant vessels, the Navy’s analysis of its current capabilities and future requirements 
once again resulted in the clear recognition of a critical vulnerability in its force structure: 
the lack of a shallow draft vessel capable of fighting in the littoral environment.87  Given 
the previously mentioned budgetary constraints and the existing capabilities in its current 
inventory, it the Navy decided to focus its main priority on developing the Littoral
83 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/systems/ship/dd-21-prog.htm; Internet.
84 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/systems/ship/ssn-21.htm; Internet.
85 DD (X) History, Program Executive Office Ships webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available 
from: http://peos. crane.navy.mil/ddx/history.htm; Internet.
86 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/systems/ship/dd-x.htm; Internet.
87 What is LCS?, Program Executive Office Ships webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available 
from: http:// peoships.crane.navy.mil/lcs/program.htm; Internet.
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Combat Ship platform, a much smaller and lower cost platform intended to enhance, 
extend, and compliment the Navy’s overall combat abilities.88
The Navy’s decision to refocus its transformational priorities did not obviate the 
need for continued development of the DD (X) or FSC family of vessels, rather it 
accentuated the Navy’s overarching desire to achieve meaningful transformation by 
adopting new platforms which would address elements of naval combat which had either 
been unnecessary, unfeasible, or overshadowed by the Cold War security environment.  It 
did, however, require a reprioritization, reallocation, and revision of the DD (X) and FSC 
programs in order to free up funding necessary to advance the design and construction of 
the LCS platform.  In all estimations, the Navy will eventually need to proceed with 
construction of the DD (X) platform in order to retain a modern and robust open ocean 
combat capability and to support the intended spiral development of the follow-on family 
of future warships.  However, there is a significant danger that delays, budgetary 
constraints, and the rising cost of naval construction will hamper, deter, or further delay 
the arrival of the DD (X) platform, a development which would obviously reverberate 
negatively throughout the FSC family.
E. THE GROWING COST OF NAVAL TRANSFORMATION
Beyond the debate over which specific platforms to procure, the Navy faces 
increasing difficulty determining how to pay for any additional platforms in an era of 
soaring construction costs and relatively fixed procurement budgets.89  As a comparison 
between Table 2 and Figure 2 below will demonstrate, the expected unit cost of the 
Navy’s desired DD (X) and CG (X) platforms considered in relation to the projected 
shipbuilding budget will severely limit the number of new platforms the Navy will be 
able to procure, thereby necessitating either a dramatic increase in shipbuilding funds or 
reliance on a much smaller overall force structure than the Navy either desires or 
currently possesses.90
88 "Modernizing the Surface Combatant Force and the Implications for the Navy's Budget," Global 
Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library /report/cbo/tnscf_may03_chapter1.htm; Internet.
89 Cavas, C. P., “Clark Calls for Shifting R&D Funds to Shipbuilding,” Navy Times, 25 July 2005, p 
18.
90 Cavas, C. P., “Navy Seeks Ways to Skirt Tight Shipbuilding Budgets,” Navy Times, 18 April 2005, 
24. 
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According to the Congressional Budget Office, “the Navy would need to spend 
$15.6 billion a year between 2005 and 2022 to build its 375-ship fleet at DoD's current
cost estimates, or $19.1 billion a year through 2022 if historical trends in cost growth 
continued.”91  While there is contention regarding these figures and their implications,92
even assuming they are correct, the very budgetary projection provided in the same 
report, and reflected in Figure 2, clearly demonstrates the best possible future case will be 
for the Navy to achieve the $15 million budget required to maintain a fleet of 
approximately 290 vessels.93  More likely, the Navy will have to accept and manage a 
further reduction of its force structure.94
In addition to its aging surface ships and submarines, the Navy also faces a 
growing challenge in maintaining a balanced fleet of combat and support aircraft.  As 
depicted in Figure 2 below, the Navy plans to spend approximately three times as much 
money on aircraft procurement and modernization over the course of the next 15 to 17 
years as compared to ship construction.  A large portion of this funding will be dedicated 
to procuring the naval variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a program which will still 
result in a net loss of almost 40 airframes than originally programmed despite an overall 
price increase of almost $11 billion due to cost overruns and procurement delays.95
91 "The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2005,"
Congressional Budget Office webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.cbo.
gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5864 &sequence=0; Internet.
92 Cavas, C. P., “11-Carrier Navy: JFK on the Chopping Block, but Mayport’s Not out of the 
Running,” Navy Times, 14 February 2005, 14. 
93 "The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans," 2005, Internet.
94 "Navy Budget Insufficient, Says U.S. Rep. Gene Taylor," United States House of Representatives 
webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.house.gov/genetaylor/navy.021805.htm; 
Internet. 
95 "The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans," 2005, Internet.
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Table 2. Average Cost of Procurement and Operation of U.S. Navy Vessels (All figures 
rounded and adjusted to represent 2005 dollars)
Ship Class
Average Procurement Cost Per 
Unit
Average Operational Cost Per 
Unit
FFG 7 $561 Million96 $19.4 Million97
DD 963 $936 Million98 $42.5 Million99
CG 47 $1 Billion100 $34 Million101
DDG 51 $900 Million102 $24.3 Million103
SSN 688 $1.3 Billion104 $21 Million105
CVN 68/77 $4 Billion106 $194 Million107
LCS $350 Million108 TBD
DD (X) $1.9 Billion109 TBD
CG (X) $2.2 Billion110 TBD
96 Couhat, J.L., Combat Fleets of the World, 194-1985. Translated by A.D. Baker. (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1984).  Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: http://www.indwes.edu/Faculty/bcupp/
combflt.htm; Internet.
97 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military /systems/ship/ffg-7-specs.htm; Internet.
98 Military Equipment Guide, Military.com webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.military. com/Resources/EQG/EQGmain?file=DD963&cat=v&lev=2; Internet.
99 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ systems/ship/dd-963-specs.htm; Internet.
100 U.S. Navy Fact File, Chief of Naval Operations webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available 
from: http://www. chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-cru.html; Internet.
101 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.military.com/ Resources/EQG/EQGmain?file=DD963&cat=v&lev=2; Internet.
102 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
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103 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
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104 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/systems/ship/ssn-688-specs.htm; Internet.
105 Ibid.
106 Global Security Organization webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available from: 
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107 Ibid.





Figure 2.  Projected Navy and Marine Corps Resources for Investment (from: 1 The Long-
Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 
2005, Congressional Budget Office webpage. Accessed 03 August 2005, available 
from: http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5864 &sequence=0; Internet)
F. INFERENCES FROM NEAR AND MID-TERM TRANSFORMATIONAL 
INITIATIVES
The Navy’s experiences in the post-Cold War security environment and its 
ongoing prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism clearly reveal weaknesses and 
inadequacies in the platforms which make up its current force structure.  Despite an 
increasing recognition of these deficiencies, soaring construction costs, rising 
employment commitments, and shifts in strategic priorities have all served to confound, 
complicate, and impede the Navy’s efforts to translate its vision of transformation into 
new platforms which can make this vision a reality.  The Navy’s progression form a Cold 
War deterrent force to peacetime service was neither pleasant nor easy and the 
unexpected and rapid transition to the post-9/11 security environment is proving to be no 
better.
The Navy has succeeded in developing, testing, and fielding transformational 
concepts aimed at altering and improving the efficiencies involved in operating, 
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maintaining, and employing its preexisting platforms and assets; however, these types of 
initiatives, although critically important, are not enough.  In order to truly transform itself 
into a newer, better balanced and more capable force, the Navy must reach a point where 
it can leave behind its legacy platforms and develop new platforms.  Rather than simply 
modifying its existing platforms to marginally accomplish tasks and missions they were 
never intended to perform, the Navy will never be truly transformed until it succeeds in 
fielding new platforms designed from their inception to address the needs of the post-
Cold War, post-9/11 security environment.
The Navy has also made progress in researching and designing new platforms; 
however, this progress has been slow and somewhat disjointed.  Paradoxically, even 
despite the costs involved, the Navy’s inability to field DD (21) can be seen as a positive 
development as, had it actually entered fleet service, it would probably have proven to be 
no more capable of addressing either the current or projected security environments than 
the DDG (51) or CG (47) classes of warships it was intended to replace, even despite its 
more advanced technology and substantially higher price.  The Navy made another 
difficult, yet practical, decision when it decided to accelerate development of the LCS 
platform.  In both of these instances, the Navy served to reconfirm its commitment to 
relevant transformation – rather than blindly progressing with programs already in place 
and calling it transformation, the Navy instead chose to reprioritize its programs in hopes 
of achieving real transformational progress.  
These types of re-directive decisions are difficult, require bold visionary 
guidance, and, as demonstrated by the previously mentioned JSF example, almost always 
result in increased costs to the effected programs.  This having been said, the discussed 
reassessments and readjustments of the Navy’s transformational initiatives appear to have 
been both necessary and timely and any long-term negative implications from these 
actions should be far outweighed by the benefits these platforms will bring to the fleet in 
terms of the new capabilities they offer.  Caution must always be taken, however, 
because additional revisions of the Navy's current transformation plan will not only result 
in additional programmatic delays and increased procurement and development costs, but 
may also result in increased scrutiny from members of Congress who will ultimately play 
a critical role in determining the future of the Navy through budgetary allocation.  Should 
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Congress come to question the Navy's ability to manage its own transformation or to 
loose confidence in the programs and platforms the Navy seeks to obtain, the 
consequences would be disastrous.
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IV. LONG-TERM TRANSFORMATION CHALLENGES
A. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE: DAYS OF FUTURE PASSED
Since the end of World War II, the Untied States Navy and Marine Corps have 
consistently demonstrated an unmatched ability to rapidly respond to military and 
political developments around the world.  While this speed and agility of response has 
certainly served to enable and support the realization of national interests through 
simultaneous deterrence of adversaries and reassurance of allies, it would be naive and 
unrealistic to believe a naval presence alone has ever been or ever will be sufficient to 
achieve the nation's desired ends.  The sad reality is that naval power, like air power, is 
severely limited in its ability to influence the course of events as they unfold because of 
three critical factors: endurance, range, and scope.  Regardless of technological advances, 
the overall combat power of any naval force remains constrained by the limited amount 
of weaponry it can employ, the range at which it can project its combat power, and the 
amount of time it can sustain independent combat operations.
While seaborne forces are mostly unrestricted in projecting their combat power 
over the 70% of the world which is covered by water, their over-land reach is generally 
limited to a few hundred miles for maritime aircraft and/or missiles and as little as 10 to 
15 miles when considering conventional gunfire systems and sensors.  In the case of 
major wars, these restrictions and limitations have historically relegated naval forces to 
supporting roles, dedicating the largest portions of their wartime efforts providing 
transport for and logistics to land forces and escorting and protecting merchant shipping.  
This sad reality does not coincide with theories promoted by many of history’s greatest 
naval strategists, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, who have failed to understand that 
while naval forces can greatly influence the prosecution of wars, only land armies can 
win them.  Control of the seas simply has not been, and probably never will be, sufficient 
to guarantee the entirety of the nation’s security interests and/or political policies.  
Amphibious assault operations present one area of notable exception, wherein the 
capability for naval forces to launch direct landward assaults offer a unique opportunity 
for seaborne forces to move beyond their traditional status as a supporting force and 
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temporarily play a primary role in prosecuting land combat operations.  Historically, 
when they have been attempted, amphibious assault operations have been of limited 
utility because they have only served one function: to achieve localized forcible entry 
into an enemy's territory in order to establish a secured beachhead which can then be used 
by land forces to support follow-on land combat operations.  While the Second World 
War and the Korean War provide numerous examples of successful forced entry 
amphibious operations, such as the Allied landings at Normandy in 1944111 or at Inchon 
in 1950,112 the vast majority of post-1945 amphibious operations have either been 
entirely unopposed, such as the 1982 landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon,113 or indirectly 
opposed, such as during the 1982 Falklands War.114
These most recent historical examples seem to reveal a rather counter-intuitive, 
and potentially disastrous trend in naval warfare which might lead the casual observer to 
believe modern amphibious operations are relatively safe, easy, and effective.  This 
conclusion, despite the happy coincidences of recent events, is easily refuted by an 
overwhelming abundance of evidence which outlines the unprecedented proliferation of 
relatively cheap and widely accessible area-denial technologies and systems which have 
become available during this same period of time.  Anti-ship mines and cruise missiles, 
kinetic and non-kinetic air defense systems, diesel submarines, fast patrol boats, and 
mechanical and electronic jamming devices, as well as early warning, tracking, and 
deception systems are widely available to countries and non-state actors who want these 
capabilities.115
111 Parker, R.A.C., The Second World War: A Short History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 195-200.
112 Lehman, J.F., On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy.
(New York: The Free Press, 2001), 307.
113 Love, R.W., History of the U.S. Navy Volume Two: 1942-1991. (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 
1992), 734-735.
114 Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S., The Battle for the Falklands. (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1983), 193-199.
115 Krepinevich, A., Watts, B., and Work, R., "Meeting the Anti-Area and Access Denial Challenge."




Despite their mostly favorable history of success, amphibious assault operations 
are not only very difficult, dangerous, complex, and expensive, in terms of manpower 
and material, but they are also very limited in terms of strategic employability and 
potential benefits.  Generally speaking, successful amphibious assault operations require 
conditions and circumstances which are not commonly available: favorable geography, 
fair weather, the element of surprise, robust intelligence, and the opportunity for 
advanced preparation of the landing zone in order to clear it of any mines and/or 
obstacles.116  Even assuming these conditions are available, the landing force itself must 
possess overwhelming combat strength in order to overcome even the weakest 
opposition.117  The size and composition of the U.S. assault force employed at Normandy 
can be used to illustrate the effort of force required for an amphibious assault to succeed 
against a robust defense.  Not accounting for Allied units or equipment, it consisted of: 3 
battleships, 9 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 4 attack transports, 93 mine vessels, 175 tank 
landing craft, 55 troop landing craft, more than 100 miscellaneous support craft, and 
some 11,000 combat aircraft, not to mention more than 250,000 combat troops, of which 
more than 130,000 were landed during the first 13 hours of the operation.118
Furthermore, an amphibious assault of this scale would not have been possible without an 
advanced land base of operations located in relatively proximity to the target from which 
to prepare and stage the operation, namely Great Britain.119
Given advances in technology, contemporary proponents of amphibious assault 
operations are quick to point out how the Normandy invasion is an inappropriate measure 
of the force necessary to achieve success under modern circumstances.120  However, 
while fundamentally correct, this statement is commonly used to draw the wrong 
conclusions.  The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps has leveraged, and continues to leverage, 
116 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Expeditionary Warfare webpage. Accessed 04 September 
2005, available from: http://www.exwar.org/Htm/8000PopE5.htm; Internet.
117 Asthon, D.F., "Tarawa:  Testing Ground for The Amphibious Assault." Global Security 
Organization webpage. Accessed 04 September 2005, available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military /library/report/1989/ADF.htm; Internet.
118 Love, 1992, 162-177.
119 Ibid.
120 Pierce, T., "Maneuver Warfare And OTH Amphibious Assaults." Global Security Organization 
webpage. Accessed 05 September 2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/1989/PT.htm; Internet.
38
advances in weapons and information technologies to provide amphibious assault forces 
dramatic increases in their combat capabilities, especially in terms of freedom and speed 
of tactical maneuver and overall operational flexibility.  However, technological 
advances have bestowed just as many benefits to potential adversaries who wish to offset 
these capabilities, many of which are cheaper to buy and easier to use, thereby allowing 
them to be fielded in greater numbers to defend larger areas.121  Rather than simplify and 
enable forced-entry amphibious assault operations, the double-edged sword of progress 
seems to have offset the comparative advantages imparted to either force; re-leveling the 
field of competition and reemphasizing the need for overwhelming combat power to 
achieve success in terms of amphibious assault operations.122
As previously mentioned, amphibious assault operations have traditionally 
represented the initial combat phase of prolonged engagements intended to establish a 
staging area for follow-on combat operations.  But following the Korean War, the vast 
majority of what navies have deemed amphibious operations have consisted of nothing 
more than the debarkation of troops and equipment under non-combat conditions, mostly 
in established harbors utilizing preexisting maritime terminals.123  Indeed, the most 
enlightening lesson to be drawn from the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ recent past is the 
feigned amphibious landing of the 1992 Gulf War, in which a viable opportunity to 
perform an amphibious assault under actual combat conditions was completely ruled out 
because the combatant commander "decided that the amphibious assault could not have 
been accomplished without a significant loss of men and equipment."124 This particular 
case reveals the strategic and tactical limitations of amphibious warfare capabilities in a 
hostile zone.  These vulnerabilities are not effected by the Navy’s apparent wealth of 
technology and experience.125
121 Krepinevich, Watts, and Work, 2005, Internet.
122 Brush, D.L., "The Opposed Amphibious Assault Dilemma." Global Security Organization 
webpage. Accessed 04 September 2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/1992/BDL.htm; Internet.
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B. SEA BASING: SETTING UP SHIP IN THE ENEMIES FRONT YARD
The noted lack of amphibious assault activity over the last 50 years inspires 
different impressions in opposing factions.  Detractors see it as justification for 
abandoning this type of capability entirely, while proponents cite the need to maintain 
amphibious forces in order to ensure some level of proficiency and capability exist within 
our range of available responses should the appropriate situation arise.126  With the 
ending of the Cold War and the subsequent prosecution of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), U.S. strategists, military leaders, and politicians have come to see amphibious 
warfare as having renewed potential as previously cooperative allies and coalition 
partners have progressively become less accommodating in terms of overseas basing 
rights, status of forces agreements, and general air, land, and sea access agreements.127
The answer to these problems, according to the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and key 
leaders within the Department of Defense, is “Sea Basing,” a retooled and re-imagined 
version of amphibious warfare with one key distinction: instead of securing a beachhead 
to support follow-on combat operations, amphibious assault forces will utilize advanced 
delivery vehicles to maneuver directly from their seaborne transports to their primary 
targets, allowing them to bypass enemy forces and/or defenses in the process (see Figure 
3 below).128  Known as “Sea to Objective Maneuver,” instead of employing 
overwhelming force in an attritional type of combat, this type of engagement would rely 
on quick, precise surgical strikes against an enemy’s critical centers of gravity, destroying 
their ability to fight without necessarily causing extensive damage or loss of life.129  Even 
more importantly, Sea Basing promises to afford the United States unconditional access 
126 Turner, S., "Is the U.S. Navy being Marginalized?" Naval War College website. Accessed 10 
September 2005, available from: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Summer/art4-su3.htm: 
Internet.
127 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments webpage. Accessed 09 September 2005, available 
from: http:// www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/P.20000927.Preparing_For_The_/P.20000927
.Preparing_For_The_.htm; Internet.
128 Clark, V., "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." Navy Office of Information 
website. Accessed 02 September 2005, available from: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib
/cno/proceedings.html; Internet.
129 Klien, J.J. and Morales, R., "Sea Basing Isn’t just about the Sea." U.S. Naval Institute webpage. 
Accessed 12 September 2005, available from: http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles04/PRO01klein
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to an enemy’s territory, overcoming the increasingly problematic need to secure and 
maintain access rights from an ally in contiguous proximity to the battle-space.130
Figure 3.  Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations (after:
Committee on Sea Basing: Ensuring Joint Force Access from the Sea Naval 
Studies Board.  The National Academies Press webpage.  Accessed 22 November 
2005, available from: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11370.html; Internet.)
The vertical lift aspect of Sea Basing is also intended to overcome one of the most 
critical vulnerabilities existing within the Navy's current fleet arsenal: the ability to clear 
landing zones and approaches of anti-ship naval mines in advance of amphibious assault 
forces.131  According to the commander of U.S. Marine Corps forces during Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer, the main reason "an amphibious 
130 "Champion of 'A New American Way of War.'"  Office of Force Transformation webpage.  
Accessed 05 September 2005, available from: http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article
_199_SEAPOWER %20MAGAZINE% 20JUNE%202003.doc: Internet.
131 Brush, 2005, Internet.
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assault was not undertaken [during the first Gulf War was] because of the mines."132
Despite a repeated acknowledgment of this deficiency and an aggressive program 
intended to double the number of fleet anti-mine platforms, the present day Navy still 
lacks a sufficient anti-mine capability.  Ironically, the Navy currently plans to 
decommission 4 of its existing anti-mine warfare platforms during fiscal year 2006, 133  a 
move which would effectively reduce the surface-based anti-mine force by almost 8% in 
a single year.134
C. THE INTENDED TRANSITION FROM UNLIKELY CONTINGENCY TO
PRIMARY OPTION
The utility of this new version of amphibious assault is envisioned as anything but 
limited and situational.  To the contrary, it is being promoted by many as the very 
solution to all of the United States’ future anti-access and area denial woes.  Testifying 
before the Congressional Budgetary Commission in 2006, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld espoused the need “to project concentrated naval power more quickly to 
confront unexpected threats,” stating that the Sea Basing concept would “allow 
expeditionary strike forces to project power quickly from floating littorals without relying 
on land bases.”135  A 2004 Naval Institute Press article, coauthored by a Navy Lieutenant 
Commander and an Army Major, contends: 
Sea Basing's single greatest advantage is the increased options it will 
provide through sea to objective maneuver. Having the ability to employ, 
move, and supply forces from a maritime environment will give our 
national leaders and combatant commanders the strategic flexibility to 
plan for and respond to crises anywhere in the world. Moreover, this 
flexibility will allow for appropriate measured responses with minimal 
132 Ibid.
133 Dorsey, J., "Navy plans to trim its fleet by 10 ships this fiscal year."  Virginia Pilot webpage.  
Accessed 15 November 2005, available from: http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.
cfm?story=94315&ran=232044; Internet.
134 MCM 1 Avenger Class and MHC 51 Osprey Class Ship Lists.  Global Security Organization 
webpage.  Accessed 20 November 2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military
/systems/ship/mcm-1-unit.htm and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/mhc-51-unit.htm; 
Internet.
135 Rumsfeld, D.H., testimony before the Congressional Budgetary Committed, Global Security 
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military/library/congress/2005_hr/ 050216-rumsfeld.pdf: Internet.
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staging requirements to many troubled regions where U.S. combat power 
or presence is needed.136
The Department of Defense’s Joint Integrating Concept for Sea Basing further 
describes the concept as providing “commanders with greater flexibility to rapidly and 
effectively build and integrate joint capabilities during the early stages of operations with 
minimal or no access to nearby land bases.”137 Along with removing the need for 
contiguous land bases of operations, proponents envision Sea to Objective Maneuver as 
allowing "rapid and continuous" combat operations supported directly from the Sea Base 
as opposed to traditional amphibious operations which offer the enemy, in the event they 
cannot prevent the establishment of an initial beachhead, a window of opportunity to 
counterattack the amphibious assault force before it can break out of the landing zone 
(see Figure 4 below).  
Figure 4.  Timeline Comparison between Traditional Amphibious Assault Operations and 
Conceived Sea to Objective Maneuver Operations Supported by a Sea Base (after:
Sea Basing Program: Sea Basing Perspective Within the Triad of Sea Power 21.  
AMI International webpage.  Accessed 22 November 2005, available from: 
http://www.amiinter.com/SeaBasingProgramNov2004.pdf; Internet.)
It remains to be seen, however, how effective this concept will be in terms of 
fulfilling these promises because the vast majority of the platforms and capabilities 
136 Klien and Morales, 2005, Internet.
137 "Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept," Defense Technical Information Center website. Accessed 
09 September 2005, available from: http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/jic_seabasing.doc; 
Internet.
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needed to realize the current vision do not exist.  Platforms such as the Heavy Lift 
LCAC's (HLLCAC's), High Speed Vessels (HSV's), Utility Landing Craft (LCU(R)), and 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV's) which will comprise the Maritime Pre-
Positioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))138 remain in the early stages of research and 
development.   Of all the envisioned platforms, the MV-22 Osprey has progressed the 
farthest and is currently undergoing advanced field testing.  However, the long term 
viability of this particular program is also suspect due to cost overrides and repeated 
catastrophic performance failures.139
D. WHAT THE READINGS FAIL TO MENTION 
Despite these purported benefits and strengths, numerous critical questions remain 
to be answered.  If as recently as 1992 amphibious assault operations were considered to 
be so prohibitively costly as to prevent a combatant commander from considering them 
as a viable combat option, what makes Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver so 
much more attractive?  If area denial strategies and anti-access capabilities are so 
disruptive to land based forces, how would Sea Based forces be less susceptible to their 
effects and/or more capable of countering them?  How effective would Sea to Objective 
Maneuver be against a landlocked enemy, especially if the intermediate coastal states 
refuse to allow assault forces transitory privileges?  Assuming the surgical strikes 
launched from the Sea Base do bring a quick conventional victory, would the limited 
combat force available be capable of addressing an insurgent uprising which may emerge 
in the post-conflict reconstruction phase of operations?  Sadly, little or no consideration is 
provided to any of these questions in the available reading.
In one way, the lack of consideration in regards to these issues is not necessarily 
surprising because Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver themselves are
developmental concepts which are still being modified and updated by experimentation 
and field testing.  Conversely, answers to these questions are absolutely critical in 
determining the feasibility of these concepts before excessive funding is allocated to their 
138 Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) MPF(F) / Seabase.  Global Security Organization 
webpage.  Accessed 21 November 2005, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military
/systems/ship/seabase.htm; Internet.
139 V-22 Osprey Testing.  Global Security Organization webpage.  Accessed 21 November 2005, 
available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-testing.htm; Internet.
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development.  The various implementations of the Sea Basing concept will require the 
development and procurement of between one140 to four new classes of ships and at least 
two new airframes.141 Given the Navy's previously discussed problems with ship 
construction and airframe procurement (see Chapter 3), the Navy will likely experience 
even greater difficulty maintaining the long-term research and development costs 
necessary to achieve a robust Sea Basing capability.  While some level of development is 
necessary to validate the Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver concepts, the 
following excerpt taken from a recent Congressional Budget Office demonstrates 
concerns about the viability of such a development program:   
Carrying out those plans would require the Navy to spend an average of 
$2.4 billion a year over the next three decades to buy new amphibious and 
maritime prepositioning ships--more than twice what it has spent on those 
categories of ships since 1980. At the same time, the Navy has 
modernization plans for other types of ships that, if fully implemented, 
would also require more resources than the Navy now spends on ship 
construction.142
E. INFERENCES FROM LONG-TERM TRANSFORMATIONAL 
INITIATIVES
Amphibious assault has always been a risky and potentially costly form of 
warfare requiring specific enabling conditions which offer limited opportunities for 
employment.  Despite these characteristics, amphibious assaults have proven to be highly 
effective, even under combat conditions, provided adequate resources and combat force 
capabilities were available to overwhelm the enemy’s defensive measures.  It must be 
noted, however, that success in terms of amphibious assault operations is a highly relative 
measure as even the positive examples cited herein have generally proven themselves to 
be quite costly in terms of manpower and material loses.
The post-9/11 security environment presents the United States with several 
previously unforeseen security challenges, including increased difficulty in terms of 
sustaining favorable foreign basing and access agreements.  Aging platforms and 
140 Cavas, C. P., “Big Changes for Sea Base,” Navy Times, 01 August 2005, 10.
141 Clark, 2005, Internet.
142 "The Future of the Navy’s Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces," Congressional 
Budget Office webpage.  Accessed 07 September 2005, available from: http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?
index=6003& sequence=0; Internet.
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increased operational commitments continue to stretch forces thin while inspiring 
increased competition for already constrained resources.  The U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps team have responded to these challenges by offering a vision of Sea Basing and 
Sea to Objective Maneuver through which they hope to provide increased flexibility, 
speed, and ease of response on a global scale while requiring fewer numbers of forward 
deployed forces and little or no contiguous land based support.
From a conceptional point of view, Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver 
seem to offer a panacea to the nation's future security needs, but many potential 
limitations and liabilities within these concepts remain unresolved.  In the short term, it is 
almost impossible to imagine Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver ever being able 
to fulfill the promises made by their proponents who openly profess their intention to 
embrace the strengths of amphibious assault and marry it to technological advances in an 
effort to address the deficiencies of land based combat forces while simultaneously 
overlooking the liabilities and limitations of the proposed remedy itself.  No matter how 
desirable their vision of the future, there is currently no practical plan that can bring this 
vision to fruition given the reality of ongoing budgetary constraints and the competing 
interests of other programs that address more pressing needs.
If Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver are to survive and mature, they will 
require generous amounts of both time and money.  The Navy’s current timeline will 
require 30 years at best to fully render and deliver the systems necessary in sufficient 
numbers to make this concept fully functional.  Not only is this overly optimistic in terms 
of steady and sustained budgeting and visionary guidance, it also assumes future 
advances in technology will further benefit Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver’s 
ability to overpower defense and gain access rather than tipping the balance of 
capabilities in favor of area denial and anti-access systems.  Such long-tem developments 
are highly unlikely as unforeseen changes in the future security environment, uncertain 
budgetary preferences, and future leadership priorities are more likely to vary radically 
over time rather than remaining consistently dedicated to these still unproven concepts.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. A NAVY FOR EVERY OCCASION
There should be no doubt or question that today's U.S. Navy is the greatest naval 
combatant force to ever sail the deep waters of the world oceans.  However, this 
statement also reveals the most glaring vulnerability of today’s Navy: a decisive 
imbalance in composition and capabilities.  The ships and submarines which currently 
sail under the U.S. flag are the product of over 50 years of incremental strategic 
adjustments aimed at building a fleet which would offset and overpower the naval might 
of the Soviet Union.  Unfortunately, while this fleet was almost perfectly attuned to wage 
and win such a competition, it has proven to be less suited to address the wide range of 
fast patrol boats, diesel submarines, and anti-ship mines which populate the littoral 
environments that will characterize the future battle-space.  
The U.S. Navy has now wholly succeeded in achieving the very control of the 
seas which Alfred Thayer Mahan so highly coveted, but to what avail?  As the Navy 
learned to a limited degree following World War II and is now rediscovering, the 
strategic logic for building and operating a robust Mahanian style fleet of capital ships 
quickly evaporates in the absence of an enemy who does not possess the same.  
Consequently, the Navy's current mastery of the seas can be understood to have far less 
to do with the strength and capabilities of the existing fleet and much more to do with the 
limited scope of its current and future adversaries' strategic concerns and increasing 
rejection of the desirability of blue-water naval forces capable of global power projection.
For these very reasons, naval transformation should be seen as the most important 
issues concerning the U.S. Navy.  The results of today's ongoing efforts will ultimately 
determine the type, structure, size, and ability, and capability of the future force available 
to both defend the nation and support its national security interests around the globe.  The 
overwhelming amount of time, effort, and cost which will be necessary to bring naval 
transformation to its full fruition requires that the Navy succeed not just in altering the 
composition of its fleet, but also in terms of how effective and suitable its transformation 
proves to be in relation to the future threat.  The absolute worst possible outcome possible 
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would be for the Navy to fully succeed in implementing its transformation plan only to 
discover itself even less capable or more poorly suited to the security environment in 
which it finds itself operating in 2020, 2040, or even 2060.
B. AN EVOLVING NOTION OF SEA POWER FOR AN EVOLVING 
WORLD
After more than 100 years of operating exclusively under the prescriptions of 
Mahanian sea power, the Navy must accept several unattractive truths of sea power: wars 
may be lost at sea, but they cannot be won there; seaborne forces are inherently limited in 
their ability to influence events ashore; and any viable sea power strategy must consider 
and include capabilities for fighting dynamic naval engagements in the shallow littorals 
and contiguous landward approaches.  These truths not only need to be embraced, they
must be used to build the foundation for future strategic planning initiatives so that a 
bridge can be made from today's fleet, which is fundamentally flawed due to its 
predominant reliance on capital ships, to a more balanced future fleet which incorporates 
a well rounded mix of both shallow water hulls designed to fight in the littorals as well as 
deep water capital ships.  Such a fleet would be best suited to ensuring continued control 
of the seas in order to support extended range supply and logistics as well as combat 
capabilities to counter increasing numbers of adversaries who primarily employ high-
speed patrol craft and diesel submarines in the shallow littorals and contiguous landward 
approaches.
C. ULTIMATE SUCCESS IS DEPENDANT UPON SHORT AND MID-TERM
EFFORTS
The Navy's current transformation plan is progressive in nature and any hope of 
long term success will be directly dependent upon short term and mid-term results both in 
terms of foundational preparation and continuing budgetary support.  The more the Navy 
fails or falters over the course of the short and mid-term, the more its long term goals and 
plans will be placed in jeopardy.  Counterintuitively, however, some amount of short 
term failure, although certainly not desirable, may actually impart greater long term 
benefits if lessons learned from these events are used to update and modify future 
planning.  One such example is the reprioritization of development for the LCS platform
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over DD (X), as such a move will allow the fleet to enhance its overall capabilities by 
incorporating new types of platforms instead of just replacing existing hulls with higher-
cost variants of themselves.  
The Navy has invested a great deal of time and effort in generating the 
Transformation Roadmap; however, it should never assume the weaknesses and shortfalls 
in its current force will be overcome by simply implementing the transformation plan as 
it currently exists.  The transformation plan must be seen as exactly that – a plan.  Not a 
binding commitment carved in stone, but a guide which must be constantly reevaluated 
and reconsidered in light of emerging information and experience in order to ensure the 
most feasible and suitable long-term outcome.  At the same time, care must be taken to 
avoid excessive alterations to the existing plan as too many dramatic shifts of the 
transformational rudder will doubtlessly result in increased costs in terms of time, effort, 
and money, as well as the unwanted potential to inspire trepidation in the halls of 
Congress.  The former possibility is bad enough, but the later could completely scuttle the 
Navy's ability to achieve meaningful transformation regardless of its overall strategic 
necessity or value.  
The Navy’s short-term transformational initiatives do seem to be following these 
prescriptions and are meeting with positive results in terms of better facilitating the 
employment of the fleet's current assets.  Through continued development and 
procurement of new platforms, the Navy is seeking to balance the composition of its fleet 
which, in turn, will better position the force to meet and more easily address the nation's 
security needs of the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment.  The lessons 
learned from procuring and operating these new platforms will enable the Navy to further 
evaluate, determine, and adjust its ongoing transformational initiatives in order to 
maintain existing capabilities while expanding and enhancing its future capabilities.  
Again, transformation itself must be understood to be a continuously evolutionary 
process: success today is required to facilitate success tomorrow, which is therein 
essential for continued success beyond tomorrow.    
D. SEA BASING: ENSURING ACCESS OR BREAKING THE BANK?
Sea Basing and Sea to Objective Maneuver form the nucleus of the Navy's 
farthest reaching transformational vision, a vision which will doubtlessly evolve radically 
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over time as budgetary constraints and lessons gleaned from ongoing research and 
development efforts are incorporated into the Navy's strategic calculus.  There is no 
doubt that amphibious assault operations, even despite their inherent strategic and tactical 
limitations, are a valuable component of the Navy and Marine Corps' arsenal of 
capabilities.  However, given the potential costs and harsh realities involved, it is hard to 
imagine a future reality wherein this type of warfare will ever be able to move beyond the 
realm of a limited contingency option and take a primary role as the preferred method of 
delivering and sustaining landward combat power.
The criticisms and counterarguments presented herein are not intended to refute 
the future utility of amphibious assault operations or even some future implementation of 
Sea Basing and/or Sea to Objective Maneuver.  However, they are intended to illuminate 
potential flaws and shortcomings in the program as it is currently envisioned.  
Amphibious assault operations, even with all their perceived liabilities and limitations, 
offer critically important capabilities to U.S. combatant commanders which, given the 
right circumstances, may very well one day represent the only viable option for realizing
the nations security interests.  When and if this day comes, the Navy and Marine Corps 
must be prepared and ready to exercise this option; however, in the short-term, the U.S. 
Navy has a more vested interest in finding ways to maintain and sustain its already thinly 
spread force structure.  It would be ill advised for the Navy to commit the bulk of its 
limited resources on aggressive research and development of these concepts when, 
despite a wealth of unrealistic strategic promises and projections, more and more 
evidence is indicating that the Navy will not be able to afford to build and operate the 
numbers and types of platforms required to make Sea Basing perform as advertised. If the 
Navy does elect to proceed despite the growing signs of danger, the long-term results will 
probably be less than optimal, especially if the Navy once again finds itself fielding a 
higher cost iteration of limited amphibious capabilities already present in the fleet. 
E. HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE 
TRANSFORMATION
Similar to the rise of the Soviet Navy after World War II, the Navy's involvement 
in prosecuting the ongoing Global War on Terrorism offers an opportunity which, if used 
properly, can revitalize the Navy and allow it to embrace a naval strategy far more 
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complex, realistic, and suitable than that promoted by the Mahanian logic which has held 
sway over all of the worlds great navies for the last 100 years.  As the greatest of the 
great navies to ever sail, no course of action could be more suitable for the U.S. Navy 
than harnessing the full potential of naval transformation and using it to build a vibrant, 
well-balanced 21st century fleet capable of defeating any and every adversary regardless 
of its size, composition, and skill - not just a blue water force of capital ships, but also a 
robust contingent of brown water littoral combat craft.  In short, a fleet worthy of the U.S. 
Navy's fine heritage and proud history.
Change is never easy and the more dramatic the change the harder it is to 
accomplish, but the U.S. Navy has repeatedly proved itself equal to every challenge it has 
faced and there is every reason to believe it will once again rise to the occasion.  The 
journey will probably not be marked by fair winds and following seas, but the Navy will 
weather the storm one way or another.  Where, exactly, the Navy's Naval Transformation 
Roadmap leads remains to be seen and the ultimate outcome will be determined by a 
discrete combination of time, vision, and money.  If the Navy can maintain a unified yet 
realistic strategic vision, updating and revising the transformation roadmap as necessary 
to correct its course along the way, and sustain budgetary and programmatic support long 
enough for its mid-term programs to reach maturity, it will most likely succeed in 
instilling meaningful, necessary, and long overdue force structure transformation.  In 
turn, successful transformation will provide the United States with a better-balanced and 
more capable Navy – one which is better suited to address the ever increasing range of 
adversaries and capabilities it will be called upon to counter throughout the current 
security environment and beyond.
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